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This paper investigates the effect of parents’ current income and
long-term family characteristics on individuals’ highest educational
qualification obtained by age 26 using UK data from the 1970 British
Cohort Study. The issues of the possible sample selection bias pro-
duced by the not completely random omission of current family income
and that of its potential endogeneity are addressed, using a hot-deck
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ity, respectively. I find evidence that current family income has a sta-
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it is one of negligible magnitude. Long-term family characteristics are
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1 Introduction
Acquiring education is often considered to be the main way in which de-
prived individuals can improve their economic and social status. In fact,
education has economic returns in terms of both higher labour incomes1
and better employment prospects. However, analyses of the demand for
education usually show that an individual’s early family background is a
powerful predictor of his/her future educational outcomes, and this casts
serious doubts on the role of education as an instrument able to promote
intergenerational mobility and reduce social inequality.
Several studies report that long-term family factors, such as parents’
education and social class, are of paramount importance for children’s edu-
cation. This partly reduces the policy relevance of analyses of the demand
for education, since policy makers are hardly able to affect most of the long-
term characteristics of a family.
However, there are certain short-term characteristics of a household,
such as its current level of income, which policy makers can indeed affect.
Understanding the role of current family income on children’s educational
achievement is therefore a central issue in the study of the demand for
education.
This paper uses data from the British Cohort Study 1970 (BCS70) to
assess the role of long-term and short-term family characteristics in deter-
mining children’s educational attainment. Unlike other data sets the BCS70
includes indicators of a child’s ability which enable the researcher to reduce
the problem of so called ability bias, i.e. the spurious correlation between
family characteristics and a child’s education which arises when ability is
genetically transmitted. An important feature of this data set is the high
number of observations with missing parental income. In the present pa-
per, therefore, I check the sensitivity of the results to the particular way in
which the observations with missing family income are treated. The ordered
probit analysis of the highest educational qualification obtained by age 26
shows that some results are sensitive to the way of handling observations
with missing values. However, estimating the model only on non-missing
observations, including a missing-value dummy for family income, or using
1For a recent survey of the literature on the return to education see for instance Card
(2001). For some evidence relating to the UK see Blundell et al. (2000) and Dearden et
al. (2002).
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a hot-deck multiple imputation procedure, all generate the same finding as
to the effect of current income: though statistically significant, the positive
effect of current family income on children’s highest educational qualification
is of negligible magnitude. Instead, the effect of long-term family charac-
teristics, such as parental education and social class, is far more important.
Moreover, I find some differences across genders: the mother’s education,
for instance, appears to have a particularly important effect on daughters’
education but not on sons’.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the prob-
lems arising in empirical studies of the effect of family income on children’s
education. Section 3 briefly reviews the main findings in the empirical lit-
erature. Section 4 describes the principal features of my empirical analysis
relative to the UK. Section 5 details the analysis of individuals’ highest
educational qualification obtained, and section 6 concludes.
2 Assessing the effect of family income empirically
Three main reasons why household income may exert a positive effect on
children’s educational attainment have been put forward in the literature:
1. education is a consumption good;
2. capital markets are imperfect;
3. the presence of uncertainty.2
In fact, using models in which the child is the decision maker, some
scholars have shown that exogenous family transfers affect the demand for
education in the presence of a consumption motive for education (Kodde
and Ritzen 1984), capital market imperfections for young people (Kodde
and Ritzen 1994) or uncertainty relating to their return to education (Lev-
hari and Weiss 1974, Kodde 1986). Although these models do not endogenise
family transfers (individual non-labour income), in general resources trans-
ferred to children may be considered a form of parents’ consumption (or
investment), which depends in a life-cycle setting on the level of household
2For a more detailed description of the various cases see the longer version of this
working paper, Bratti (2002).
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permanent income. The literature on consumption3 has shown that ex-
cess sensitivity of consumption to current income may be generated by the
presence of capital market imperfections (for parents in this case), or by the
presence of uncertainty over (parents’) future incomes, which causes these in-
comes to be more heavily discounted. This provides empirical giustification
for the inclusion of both long-term family characteristics affecting household
permanent income and current family income in demand-for-education re-
gressions. In this setting, one would expect household permanent income to
be significant only if at least one of the three cases listed above applies to
children and the excess sensitivity of children’s education to current family
incomes in the presence of credit restrictions for adults or uncertainty over
parents’ future income. If we consider the family as the decision maker (see
for instance Becker and Lewis 1973, Becker and Tomes 1976, Cigno 1993)
the sole case in which we do not expect household permanent income to be
significant is that of perfect capital markets in the old-age security hypoth-
esis (Cigno 1993). In both the cases of imperfect capital markets and of
the presence of uncertainty for parents’ income, then, we expect also cur-
rent household income to be important, regardless of children’s education is
consumption or investment.
However, empirical assessment of the effect of current family income on
children’s education poses some problems.
First, it is useful to distinguish between the effects of permanent and
transitory family income, since it is the latter which can be more easily
affected by policy makers. By including long-term parents’ attributes, like
education and social class, in demand-for-education regressions it is possible
to single out the effect of current income free from cross-correlations, which
can be considered the effect of transitory income. This implies that the ef-
fect of long-term household characteristics comprises both pecuniary effects,
operating through permanent income, and non-pecuniary effects such as the
‘quality of parenting’.
Second, it may be that certain characteristics contribute both to house-
hold income and to children’s schooling. An example is parental ambition,
or other parents’ personality traits. If these traits are unobservable to the
econometrician (and not controlled for), the effect of family income may
simply pick up the effect of other factors (simultaneity bias). When the
3See for example Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995).
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unobserved parental attribute is innate ability, the problem is given the spe-
cific name of ability bias. The general ‘solution’ to these problems is the use
of instrumental variables (IV) techniques which require the analyst to find
variables uncorrelated with the unobserved parental traits but correlated
with parents’ current income. In both cases, Shea (2000) and Mayer (1997),
for instance, have suggested measures of families’ occupation and financial
capital as possible sources of valid instruments.
I include current family income along with a set of long-term charac-
teristics relating to the family background, such as parents’ education and
social class, in my empirical analysis since these are expected to be closely
correlated with and act as a proxy for permanent household income. My
purpose in including them is to separate out the effects of long-term family
characteristics and transitory family income. The problem of ability bias
should be greatly attenuated by the inclusion of a measure of individual
ability at age 10 and by the use of an IV procedure (for parents’ income,
see Appendix A). The simultaneity bias should instead be mitigated by the
inclusion of a proxy for ‘parenting quality’ (see Mayer 1997), i.e. the inter-
est of the parents in a child’s education assessed by the teacher when the
child was 10 years old, which Feinstein and Symons (1999) found is the most
important ‘parenting’ variable.
3 Previous empirical literature: the role of house-
hold income
Study of the demand for education using micro-data has a long tradition
in the UK. Here I focus only on some recent investigations into the role of
household income.4
Rice (1987) estimates a probit model of the decision to go on to post-
compulsory education in the UK using data from the 1976 Family Expendi-
ture Survey. She finds that current household income (when the child is 16
years old) is not significant in explaining the decision to continue in post-
compulsory education for males, whereas its effect is statistically significant
and positive for females. For the latter, the introduction of educational
maintenance allowances (EMA) is predicted to raise the probability of par-
4For a comprehensive survey of the literature on children’s attainments see Haveman
and Wolfe (1995).
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ticipating in education significantly. To be noted is that Rice is unable to
control either for child ability or for parents’ education, and that her esti-
mates of the effect of current family income probably suffer from so-called
ability bias (see Griliches 1977) and partially capture also the effect of long-
term family characteristics.
Micklewright (1989) uses data from the National Child Development
Study (NCDS) to analyse the probability of staying on at school after the
minimum leaving age (16). He finds that once a child’s ability and type
of school have been controlled for, parental education and social class re-
main significant, while current family income is not important for a child’s
probability of staying at school.5
Ermisch and Francesconi (2000a) estimate an education equation (the
highest educational qualification obtained) using data from the British House-
hold Panel Study (BHPS) 1991-95 and an ordered probit model. They find
a strong current family income6 effect for women, but not for men. The
same authors, Ermisch and Francesconi (2001), using data from the BHPS
1991-97 and an ordered logit model, find that children from families in the
bottom income quartile (when the child is 16 years old) have significantly
lower educational attainments (levels of education).7 In both studies, Er-
misch and Francesconi control for long-term family characteristics (such as
parental education and social class) but do not include controls for a child’s
ability in the education equation.
Harmon and Walker’s (2000) study of early school leaving uses Family
Resource Survey data over 1994-97, finding that parental income effects are
small, and moreover not statistically robust, whereas parental education has
a very significant bearing on a child’s probability of staying on at school at
age 16.8
Feinstein (2000) uses data from the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70)
and finds that both parental social class and, especially, parental education
have strong effects on a child’s minimum educational qualification, whilst the
effect of current income is significant but negligible (all family background
5Although the author states that this result may be due to the fact that the income
variable is affected by a considerable measurement error, the use of the variable related
to bad household financial conditions produces identical results.
6Family income is measured when the child is 16 years old.
7In this second paper they do not perform separate analyses by gender.
8They use an IV procedure to estimate the effect of exogenous variations in family
income.
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variables are measured when the child is aged 10).
Chevalier and Lanot (2002) use data from both the NCDS and the BCS70
in order to investigate the role of family background and financial character-
istics on children’s educational achievement (i.e. the age at which they left
full-time education). They use a categorical income variable in their ordered
probit model, finding that current ‘family income remains over and above
its effect on ability a significant determinant of schooling’ (p.9). Chevalier
and Lanot then propose an alternative estimation procedure which greatly
reduces the importance of current family income.9
McCulloch and Joshi (2002) estimate the impact of current family in-
come on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test10 (PPVT) using NCDS data.
They employ multilevel analysis and multiple imputation techniques to ad-
dress the issue of missing income information and find that ‘it would take
very large increases in income to produce a great effect on children’s profi-
ciency at the vocabulary test’ (p. 297).
The empirical evidence on the role of current family income is ‘mixed’
not only for the UK but for other countries as well.
Cameron and Heckman (1998) use US data from the Occupational Change
in Generations (OCG) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
to estimate an ordered discrete choice model. They find that long-term fam-
ily characteristics are far more important than current family income (when
the child is 16 years old) in determining children’s educational outcomes,
and that when measures of a child’s ability are included, household income
is not statistically significant.
Blau (1999) analyses data from the NLSY and finds that family back-
ground characteristics play a more important role than family income in
determining the early cognitive development of children, and that only poli-
cies addressed to permanent income have a non negligible effect.
Cameron and Heckman (2001) use US data from the NLSY to estimate a
schooling transition model with individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity, find-
ing that family income (measured as a two-year average between age 14 and
age 18) plays a significant role in high school completion while it has a small
effect on college attendance.
Plug and Vijverberg (2001), using US data from the Wisconsin Longitu-
9Family income is measured when the child is 14 years old in the NCDS and when the
child is 10 in the BCS70.
10The PPVT is a measure of verbal intelligence and scholastic aptitude.
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dinal Survey, find that family income affects a child’s schooling attainment
mainly through its permanent component, whereas its short-run component
exerts a positive, but quantitatively small, effect on a child’s educational
attainment.
Shea (2000) examines US data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) finding that unpredictable exogenous changes in parental income
have a negligible impact on children’s human capital. However, parental
income does matter at the lowest levels of income, which suggests that credit
constraints may be binding for low-income households.
Lefebvre and Merrigan (1998) using Canadian data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY), find that the amount
of money a family earns does not affect a child’s cognitive development,
although receiving welfare has a strong negative effect on the PPVT score
for children aged 4 and 5.
Maurin (2002) uses French data from the Enqueˆte Permanente sur les
Conditions de Vie, IV techniques and a semiparametric approach to find
that low income strongly affects early school transitions.
Bratti (2001) studies the probability of going on to post-compulsory ed-
ucation in Italy, using data drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of House-
hold Income and Wealth (SHIW). He finds a statistically significant positive
impact exerted by current family income (when the child is 14), especially
as regards males in Central and Southern Italy, even after controlling for
long-term family characteristics but not for a child’s ability.
The intention of this paper is to add new evidence to the existing research
by:
1. using the BSC70, a relatively unexploited and rich data-set able to
show new evidence on a more recent British cohort, compared to
studies using the British NCDS (containing data on the 1958 British
cohort). In fact, economic theory suggests that the impact of cur-
rent household income on children’s education may vary across time
because income uncertainty, preferences and capital market imper-
fections change over time. For this reason, study of a new British
cohort is valuable per se. Moreover, the availability of indicators of a
child’s innate ability attenuates the problem of ability bias (i.e. the po-
tentially spurious correlation posited between parental variables and
a child’s attainment on the basis of inherited ability), compared to
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studies which must to rely exclusively on instrumental variables tech-
niques11 in order to identify the effect of exogenous variations in cur-
rent family income;
2. addressing the issue of the potential non-random omission of current
household income with respect to individual observed characteristics,
which may introduce a sample selection bias in the analysis, by means
of a hot-deck multiple imputation procedure and using different ways
of handling missing income observations to compare the results;
3. investigating the specific role of long-term and short-term family vari-
ables for a child’s highest educational qualification, using an ordered
probit analysis.
My approach in this paper differs from that of Chevalier and Lanot
(2002), who also use BCS70 data, mainly because I analyse the highest
educational qualification obtained and not the age at which individuals left
school; I consider a continuous measure of income rather than dummies for
income groups.12 The main differences with respect to Feinstein (2000), who
also investigates BCS70 data, are the following: Feinstein uses missing value
dummies for missing household income while I compare different ways of
handling missing observations; he uses an average weekly income measure;13
he estimates three separate probit regressions for the minimum educational
qualification obtained (i.e. O-levels, A-levels and university degree), while
I use an ordered probit model which seems to rationalise the underlying
economic theory better (see Cameron and Heckman 1998 and section 4.2 of
this paper).
4 The empirical analysis
The following subsections describe the data, the econometric model and the
explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis to estimate education
11And encounter the usual problem of finding valid identifying instruments. Studies
using the BHPS, for example, do not control for children’s ability.
12Chevalier and Lanot (2002) do not say how observations with missing family income
were treated. However, judging from the size of their sample, it seems that they were
dropped from the analysis.
13The procedure used to obtain this variable is not specified in the paper, but since in-
come is reported in categorical form in the BCS70, each individual was probably attributed
the midpoint of his/her income group.
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regressions.
4.1 Data description
In this paper I use data drawn from the BCS70. The BCS70 began in 1970
when data were collected on the births and families of 17,198 babies born
in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland from the 5th to the 11th
of April. There are currently five complete follow-up surveys available: 5-
year, 10-year, 16-year, 26-year and 30-year. As to the highest educational
qualification achieved I focus on the 26-year follow-up, since the 30-year one
has only recently become available and the quality of the data is still being
examined. In order to carry out my analysis I need the family income and
the highest educational outcome of individuals included in the BCS70. For
this reason I use a matched sample of individuals who replied to both the 16-
year and the 26-year follow-up surveys.14 Like other authors, I use current
parents’ income and other family background variables when the individual
is aged 16 (i.e. at the minimum school leaving age).
The matched sample includes 7,141 individuals. I drop 293 individu-
als for whom education information is not available. The distribution of
the highest educational qualifications obtained at age 26 by the remaining
6,848 individuals is: 3.5% less than O-levels, 22.61% O-levels, 36.08% vo-
cational qualifications, 10.98% A-levels or equivalent qualifications, 26.83%
undergraduate (UG) or postgraduate (PG) degrees.
4.2 The econometric model
In the empirical literature, a popular way to model educational choices is to
use an ordered discrete choice model (hereafter ODCM). Most of the studies
on individual educational outcomes surveyed in section 3 used an ordered
probit or an ordered logit model.
Cameron and Heckman (1998) offer a rare example of how a ODCM can
be interpreted in an optimising framework. Here I use a slightly modified
14In order to take account of panel attrition, I initially estimated some probit models
including a high number of explanatory variables in order to compute the probability of
response and to weight the observations. In all cases the proportion of the variance in the
response rate explained by the models was very low, with almost no variable significant and
very imprecise estimates. I interpreted these findings as an indication of the randomness
of response, with respect to individual observed characteristics, and I accordingly used
the unweighted observations.
version of their model. Let us assume that the direct costs of schooling
level j, which can be years of schooling or educational qualifications, given
the individual’s characteristics X = x are c(j|x), which are assumed to be
weakly convex and increasing in j. The X are the same across all schooling
transitions. Let us also assume that c(0|x) = 0 and that the discounted
lifetime return to schooling is R(j|), concave and increasing in j, with
R(0|) > 0, where  is a person specific shifter of the return to education
(in the literature on the returns to education it is typically the unobservable
individual’s ability). The optimal level of schooling is determined by the
individual15 by solving the problem:
Max
j
[R(j|)− c(j|x)] (1)
for j = 0, ..., s, where s is the highest educational qualification achievable.
Let us assume that  is stochastic,  ⊥ X and that:
R(j|) = R(j) (2)
where E() = 1,  ≥ 0, while
c(j|x) = c(j)ψ(x) (3)
where ψ(x) ≥ 0.
If s is the optimal educational level then:
[c(s)− c(s− 1)]ψ(x)
R(s)−R(s− 1) ≤  ≤
[c(s+ 1)− c(s)]ψ(x)
R(s+ 1)−R(s) . (4)
 is therefore bounded by the ratios of the marginal return to the marginal
cost of the different educational qualifications. If  is continuously dis-
tributed and defining:
exp[l(j)] =
R(j)−R(j − 1)
c(j)− c(j − 1) (5)
15Alternatively, a problem of the same form is obtained by assuming, for instance, that
parents are altruistic and decide the optimal schooling level of their child by maximising
his/her consumption.
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then:
Pr(j = s|X = x) = Pr[exp[l(s)]ψ(x) ≤  ≤ exp[l(s+ 1)]ψ(x)]. (6)
If we further assume that ψ(x) = exp(−xβ), the ODCM takes the more
familiar form:
Pr(j = s|X = x) = Pr[l(s)− xβ ≤ µ ≤ l(s+ 1)− xβ] (7)
where µ = ln(). The parameters to be estimated are β and the cut-
points l(j)′s. In this framework individual and parental attributes increase
or decrease the cost of education and therefore affect the probability of ob-
taining the different educational qualifications. On this assumption I follow
Cameron and Heckman (1998), who in turn draw on Becker (1975), only for
illustrative purposes. The specification can be adjusted so that it can also
allow for the return to education to depend on individual and family char-
acteristics, see for instance Lauer (2002). However, this has no empirical
relevance, since only the effect of the covariates on the ratio of the marginal
return to the marginal cost of the educational qualifications, and not on the
single components (return and cost), can be identified.
Hence, Cameron and Heckman (1998) offer a simple economic rationali-
sation for the ODCM and an economic interpretation for the cut-points.
4.3 Explanatory variables
In this section I list the explanatory variables included in the economet-
ric model, since they may affect the cost and the return to education. In
order to ensure comparability of results, for the specification of the educa-
tion equation I follow the previous literature. When not stated otherwise,
all variables are measured when the child was aged 16. The explanatory
variables included are:16
16In all regressions they are entered separately. I prefer not to include interaction terms
because, in my opinion, this would hanger the interpretation of the estimated effects
(for instance, it would be difficult to interpret the interaction between current income
and parental education or social class, since the last two variables are also proxies for
permanent household income). Moreover, using a hot-deck procedure, any interaction
term involving household income generates a new variable with missing values needing
imputation.
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- British ability scales (BAS).17 This is an indicator of ‘child quality’.18
The BAS score is computed according to performance on a question-
naire which assesses both verbal and mathematical ability.19 The BAS
score is computed at age 10, so as to reflect mostly innate ability and
early parental inputs. I include a dummy for individuals with a miss-
ing BAS score. The inclusion of an ability score enables the researcher
to reduce the problem of so-called ability bias. In fact, in the case that
the ability of a child is not observed, the positive relationship between
family income and a child’s education may be only spurious and driven
by the correlation between a child’s ability and his/her parents’ ability,
which affects their income.
- Parents’ education and social class. I include both mother’s and fa-
ther’s education and social class. These are long-term family factors.
The impact of parents’ education and social class on children’s edu-
cational outcomes may operate through several channels: it may af-
fect the taste for education (non-pecuniary effects), the ‘quality of
parenting’,20 or it may be a proxy for permanent income affecting
the consumption and investment demand for education. Moreover, it
helps to partial out the effect of current family income from its perma-
nent component. I consider the following social classes: professional
occupations (I), managerial and technical occupations (II), skilled oc-
cupations - non manual (IIINM), skilled occupations - manual (IIIM),
partly skilled (IV), unskilled (V), student and missing social class (and
a dummy if the parent is dead).
- Age of the parents. This may affect, for example, future economic
constraints, such as future family incomes (see Gambetta 1987). A
dummy variable for omitted age is also included.
- Parents’ interest in children’s education. I include dummies for the
17See Elliot et al. (1979).
18According to Becker (1975), for instance, children at maturity decide on the total
amount of investment in education on the basis of their parents’ earlier choice of investment
in ‘child quality’.
19Unlike Chevalier and Lanot (2002), I do not consider maths and reading scores sep-
arately since they are strongly correlated, which may cause multicollinearity problems
(compare with Feinstein 2000).
20See for instance Datcher-Loury (1988), who finds that greater time devoted to child
care by highly educated mothers raises children’s years of schooling.
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level of mother’s and father’s interest in their child’s education as
assessed by the teacher when the child was 10 years old. There are five
possible levels: interested, moderately interested, scarcely interested,
not interested, cannot say. Feinstein and Symons (1999), for instance,
find in their study of secondary school attainment that the quality of
‘parenting’ is more important than parental education, and that the
most important parental input is interest in children’s education.
- Smoker. This is a dummy for the individual who is a habitual smoker.
It may be a proxy for the individual discount rate.21
- Disability and ethnicity. These are included in order to assess the
degree of social exclusion, i.e. the impact of belonging to a minority
on educational attainment.
- Siblings. I include the number of younger, same age, older but aged
under 21, older and aged over 21, siblings in the family in order to
take the composition of the family into account. In fact, siblings of
different ages may compete for the allocation of monetary resources
within a family or for parents’ child care time.22
- Family structure I include dummies for the structure of the family:
both natural parents present, natural father only, natural mother only,
natural father and relatives, natural mother and relatives, other situ-
ation and missing family structure.
- Residence. I include dummies for residence in England, Wales or Scot-
land.23 There may be regional differences in educational attainment
due, for instance, to different traditions in setting value on education
or to school quality effects.
- Neighbourhood characteristics. I consider the characteristics of the
neighbourhood: aﬄuent, rural, poor, other. The characteristics of the
neighbourhood, over and above family income, may also be associated
21Harmon et al. (2000), for instance, observe that: ‘...smoking when young is a sign of
having a high discount rate - since young smokers reveal that they are willing to incur the
risk of long term damage for short term enjoyment’ (p.24).
22Stafford (1987), for instance, finds that the presence of closely age-spaced siblings
within a family negatively affects children’s school performance.
23Although the BSC70 also includes individuals resident in Northern Ireland, the
(matched) sample used in this paper does not.
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with children’s educational attainment (see for instance Brooks-Gunn
et al. 1993).
- Home ownership. I include controls for home owned outright by par-
ents, home owned with mortgage, home rented and missing house in-
formation. This can be considered as a proxy for the wealth and the
permanent income of a family.
- Family income. This is current weekly parents’ income. The BCS70
reports parents’ income in categorical form. After controlling for long-
run family characteristics which are proxies for permanent income and
contextual factors (such as the parents’ interest in children’s educa-
tion) this variable captures the financial effect of transitory family
income. Since family income is of primary interest in my analysis, I
shall devote more space to its description in the following section.
Means and standard deviations of the variables are reported in table 1.
Blau (1999) claims that many of the explanatory variables included in
previous studies (and some of those that I have included, such as parents’
education) should be excluded from a reduced form model of the demand for
education because they are potentially endogenous. However, Blau himself
does not take a ‘purist’ reduced form approach.24 As I said, I followed a
specification widely used in the literature. It may be argued that even if
some variables are endogenous, such as parents’ education and family struc-
ture, they are predetermined and (albeit to different extents) the related
decisions are not easily reversible and cannot be changed in the short-run.25
This is particularly true if we want to assess the impact on children’s educa-
tion of transitory variations in household income,26 which are not likely to
24In fact, although in his study of children’s development Blau estimates two models, one
including household income and the other including mother’s wage and nonwage income
(since labour supply may be endogenous), he does not take account of the fact that the
mother’s wage depends on variables, like her education, which he considers endogenous
and excludes from the analysis.
25Unlike in the case of the demand for non-durable goods, the demand for some con-
sumption and investment goods, such as parents’ education or children (see Becker and
Lewis 1973), is durable and irreversible. For instance, if children are an ‘inferior good’,
even if the parents’ income increases at a certain point in the life-cycle, they cannot reduce
their realised fertility (some choices are not reversible!).
26Since most policy interventions concern the period in which the decision to go on to
post-compulsory education must be made.
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affect long-term family decisions. In this respect, conditional demand rather
than unconditional demand functions might be of particular interest for pol-
icy interventions. Another way to justify the inclusion of potential choice
variables in the right hand side (RHS, hereafter) of education regressions is
that the main source of endogeneity is the omission of innate ability, and
that once it has been observed and controlled for, or proxied, the problem
disappears.
Hence, my model can be seen either as a reduced form model, if all the
explanatory variables included are exogenous, or as a conditional demand
model if some of the variables included in the RHS of the education equation
are choice variables.
4.3.1 Family income
As said, the BCS70 reports parents’ income in categorical form. It may
be convenient to use a continuous measure of household income for at least
two reasons, one statistical and the other practical. Firstly, the use of a
continuous income variable rather than income groups increases the precision
of the estimate of the effect of current income. Secondly, the BCS70 groups
weekly household income into classes of 50 pounds sterling. This means that
if income groups are used, differences in educational attainment can only be
assessed between individuals falling into different groups. However, policy
makers are likely to be interested in finer policy interventions.27
In order to obtain a continuous income variable, I follow Stewart (1983),
using interval regression techniques to predict parents’ income. The proce-
dure is also briefly explained in Appendix A. In the interval regression for
parental income I include several explanatory variables, among which the
one-digit Standard Industrial classification 1980 (SIC 80) and the Standard
Occupational Classification 1980 (SOC 80) of parents’ jobs. The results are
reported in table 2.
27For individuals with household income at the lower bound of each group a 50 pounds
increase in income would be necessary to change group. 50 pounds at the 1986 value are 85
pounds at the 1999 value. The Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA) pilot scheme
started in September 1999 in the UK provided 16-19 years old students with a financial
allowance of 30 pounds or 40 pounds per week (for annual family income less than 13,000
pounds), depending on the piloting area, if they remained in full-time education after year
11 (see Chevalier and Lanot 2002). It is evident that a transfer of 50 pounds per week at
the 1986 value would largely exceed the amount of the pilot scheme.
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Family income is available only for 4,365 individuals (63.74% of the ob-
servations). Since the high number of missing values may be an issue, in
order to assess the robustness of the results to different ways of treating
observations with missing values I carried out several analyses:
1. I simply discarded the observations with missing household income;
2. I included a dummy for the observations with missing household in-
come;
3. I imputed family income using a multiple hot-deck procedure,28 with
10 imputations.29
While the first two methods are frequently used in empirical work,30 the
third is relatively new and represents an attempt to give more satisfac-
tory treatment to the problem of missing information. A major assumption
with the hot-deck procedure is that the missing data are missing at ran-
dom (MAR), the probability that a line is missing varying only with respect
to the variables specified in the imputation model (also called the case of
ignorable non-response). A hot-deck procedure finds for each respondent
with missing values a matching respondent with non missing data, where
matching means ‘close’ with respect to the variables specified in the impu-
tation model, and replaces all the values of the non respondent with those
of the matching respondent.31 By repeating the procedure several times it
is possible to obtain many complete data sets from which to obtain valid
inferences with standard complete-data tools. Graphs showing the distribu-
tion of income for the non-missing and the imputed observations are given in
figure 1. It turns out that the imputed incomes are mainly drawn from the
28I used the hotdeck command in Stata (see Mander and Clayton 2001). Lines with
missing values were replaced with lines sampled from the non-missing observations. The
approximate Bayesian bootstrap method of Rubin and Schenker (1986) was used.
29Rubin (1987) shows that the efficiency of an estimate based on M imputations is
approximately (1 + γ/M)−1, where γ is the rate of missing information, in my sample
about 0.36. Therefore, using 10 imputations the efficiency in my case is 0.97. The efficiency
gained by using more than 10 imputations is usually very low, unless the rate of missing
is very high.
30See for instance Ermisch and Francesconi (2000), who drop observations with missing
values, and Blau and Grossberg (1992), who include missing value dummies.
31This also implies that if the observed characteristics are strongly correlated with the
individual unobserved characteristics, the problem of selection on unobservables should
be negligible.
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lower tail of the income distribution. This reflects the fact that low-income
families may be more reluctant to provide income information.32 Therefore,
using the sample with non-missing income might introduce a serious sam-
ple selection bias in the analysis due to the fact that income is not missing
completely at random (MCAR). I used 10 imputations, and the estimates
(coefficients and standard errors) were corrected for the uncertainty arising
from the sampling variability under the imputation model (see Appendix B).
In order to examine the performance of the imputation procedure, a ran-
dom sample (36%) without replacement was drawn from the sample with
non-missing family income and reset to missing income. I then used the
multiple hot-deck procedure with 10 imputations on the ‘artificial’ sample.
The difference in absolute value between the ‘true’ and the ‘imputed’ income
was less than 5 pounds for about 82% of the imputed observations.
I specified the rationale for including parents’ income in educational re-
gressions in section 2. The reader will have noticed that I excluded from
the theoretical survey all models in which parents’ child care time directly
affects children’s educational outcomes. In those models, parental work has
a twofold effect: a direct negative effect, since it displaces parents’ time from
child care, and an indirect positive effect operating through the increased
monetary resources invested in ‘child quality’. However, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that childrearing is particularly intensive at early ages, when
the child’s cognitive development is still incomplete. Blau and Grossberg
(1992), for instance, maintain that the effect of mother’s employment de-
pends on the timing of labour supply. They find that the negative first-year
effect of mother’s employment is mainly a direct effect due to the reduction of
child care time on the part of working mothers, while the net positive effect
in later years is mainly due to the increase in household income. Ermisch and
Francesconi (2000b) find that mothers’ full-time employment has a negative
effect on a child’s educational attainment only at ages 0-5. There is con-
sequently some evidence that, having controlled for ‘child quality’ through
the BAS score, which is the result of a child’s innate ability and parental
time and monetary inputs at early ages, the effect of parental work when
the child is aged 16 acts through household income only.
32Income surveys sometimes observe higher non-response also at high income levels. In
our case the fact that the lower limit of the last income group is not very high, 500 pounds
per week (jointly for both parents), may in part explain this finding.
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5 Determinants of the level of education: results
of the ordered probit analysis
In this section I describe the results obtained from the estimation of an
ordered probit model of the highest educational qualification obtained. Al-
though the economic interpretation of an ODCM rests upon some restrictive
assumptions (see section 4.2), it remains nonetheless the econometric specifi-
cation most widely used to model educational outcomes. The ordered probit
model can be derived from equation (7) by assuming lognormality of .33
The discrete nature of the educational outcome is analysed using an
ordered probit with 5 outcomes: less than O-levels, O-levels, vocational
qualifications, A-levels or equivalent, undergraduate (UG) or postgraduate
(PG) degrees. I sometimes refer to this last category as Higher Education
(HE).34 The results of the estimation are shown in table 3 for males and table
4 for females. The reference individual had the following characteristics at
age 16: white ethnicity, no disabilities, non-smoking, living in England in
a house owned outright by his/her parents, in a relatively aﬄuent area, in
a family with both natural parents, both parents with university education,
from social class I and interested in their children’s education.
Since the previous literature (see section 3) seems to suggest a different
effect of parents’ income on male and female children’s education, I per-
formed separate analyses by gender.
While most of the results were robust to the particular treatment of the
missing information, some were sensitive to the specific strategy adopted
to handle observations with missing parents’ income.35 Looking at males
(table 3), for instance, and comparing the first two columns, perhaps the
most striking feature is that including a missing-value dummy for omitted
33In this case the probability in equation (7) becomes: Pr(j = s|X = x) = Φ((l(s +
1) − xβ)/σ) − Φ((l(s) − xβ)/σ), where Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function
and σ is the standard deviation of µ.
34The order used is the natural order in which the different educational certificates are
obtained in the educational system. I placed vocational education before A-levels applying
the criterion of the degree of generality and abstractness of the human capital acquired. In
this sense vocational education may furnish specific human capital compared to A-levels,
which impart a more abstract and general form of knowledge usually required to enter
university.
35These observations will be sometimes called ‘missing observations’ throughout the
paper.
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current household income greatly reduces the size of the income coefficient.
Moreover, statistically significant effects of mother’s education, especially
at the lowest levels of schooling, and age emerge. A possible explanation
for this may be the positive correlation between mother’s education and
age and household income. In that case, in the analysis using missing-
value dummies, a low mother’s education may be picking up the effect of a
low family income. Hence, simply discarding the observations with missing
values and including a missing-value dummy may produce very different
qualitative and quantitative implications for the analysis.
In what follows I shall focus on the results of the analysis using the
hot-deck imputation, since, as said, it is a more accurate way to treat the
observations with missing information. The multiple hot-deck imputation
method is a compromise between the need to use a larger data set, exploiting
all the information available and increasing the precision of the estimates,
and that of isolating the effect of the variable with missing values, avoid-
ing treatment of the observations with missing values as a homogeneous
category.36
The coefficients of the ordered probit model are difficult to interpret. A
positive sign for the coefficient of a variable means that the variable raises the
probability of the highest outcome and reduces that of the lowest. However,
if we are interested in the effect on the intermediate outcomes, predicted
probabilities or marginal effects must be computed. Hence, tables 5 and 6
report the marginal effects for males and females, respectively, computed
at the sample average values for all variables. In the following sections
I comment only on the results relating to parental income and long-term
family characteristics.
5.1 Males
The predicted probabilities of the five educational outcomes for the ‘average’
male individual (i.e. the individual with sample mean characteristics) are:
0.6% less than O-levels, 11.8% O-levels or equivalent, 38% for vocational
education, 14.6% A-levels or equivalent, 35% for HE.
Living in rented accomodation reduces37 the probability of HE by 12.2
36As happens when a missing-value dummy is included.
37In the comment, I interpret the effects in a ‘causal’ way, even if there might be
endogeneity problems for some variables, as stated in section 4.3.
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percentage points.38 This can be interpreted as a wealth effect of the house-
hold’s financial resources on the child’s education. Living in a rural area
reduces the probability of HE by 14.1 percentage points.
There is a positive effect of early academic ability on educational attain-
ment. A one standard deviation (SD=14.7) increase in the BAS score raises
the probability of HE by 15.6 percentage points.
As is often found, father’s education is a powerful predictor of children’s
educational outcomes: children whose fathers have less than O-levels have a
18.7 percentage points lower probability of HE compared to children whose
fathers have a university education (UG or PG degrees), and children whose
fathers possess O-level qualifications have a 13.5 percentage points lower
probability. The mother’s education has no effect on her son’s education.
Also noticeable is the positive effect of the father’s social class. Children
with fathers from social classes IIIM, IV and V, for instance, are about 23
percentage points less likely to receive HE than children from social class
I. Since I controlled for factors which affect, or are proxies for, the ‘quality
of parenting’, such as parents’ education and their interest in children’s
educational outcomes, this is likely to be a pecuniary effect, i.e. the effect of
permanent family income. The same effect is not found for mother’s social
class.
Children with fathers only moderately interested in their education when
they were 10 years old are about 7 percentage points less likely to complete
HE than children with fathers interested in their education.
Finally, parents’ income has a positive effect on children’s education.
Increasing weekly household income by 24 pounds sterling, the 1986 equiv-
alent of 40 pounds at the 1999 value, which is the maximum amount of
the 1999 EMA pilot scheme (see footnote 26), raises the probability of HE
by 0.7 percentage points while reducing the probabilities of the lower out-
comes. The same effect computed from the models estimated only on non
missing observations and including missing-value dummies are 0.8 and 0.4
percentage points, respectively. It is worth noting that this would be the
effect of an increase in non-school contingent family income. This is different
from the effect of an increase in school contingent family income, such as
38The differences are with respect to the ‘average’ male individual possessing the refer-
ence characteristic of the specific group of variables considered. In this case, for instance,
the difference is with respect to the ‘average’ male individual living in accomodation owned
by his parents.
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that produced by school vouchers or an EMA. Hence, though statistically
significant, the size of the effect of household transitory income does not
seem to be important, and this conclusion is not sensitive to the particular
treatment of observations with missing family income.
5.2 Females
The predicted probabilities of the five educational outcomes for the ‘aver-
age’ female individual are: 0.7% less than O-levels, 14.7% O-levels, 42.1%
vocational qualifications, 15.7% A-levels or equivalent, 26.8% for HE.
Living in rented housing is associated with a 9.1 percentage points lower
probability of HE.
A one SD increase in the BAS score raises the probability of HE by 17.2
percentage points. Hence, the effect of ability is greater for females than for
males.
In the case of females, too, there is a positive gradient for father’s ed-
ucation: children with fathers possessing less than O-levels education, for
instance, have a 9.4 percentage points penalty in the probability to complete
HE, a weaker effect than that found for males. However, an interesting find-
ing is that for females there is also a positive effect of mother’s education,
which is greater than that of father’s education. Children with mothers who
have less than O-levels are 30.3 percentage points less likely to obtain a HE
education, and those with mothers with A-levels are 19.1 percentage points
less likely. Similar results have been found by Blundell et al. (1997) who
observe that father’s and mother’s years of education affect the probability
of A-level attainment of both males and females, with a dominant effect of
mother’s education on the educational attainment of females. In the same
study, mother’s years of education are not significant for the HE attainment
of males but are significant for females. Glick and Sahn (2000) find similar
evidence for Guinea, where mother’s education has a significant impact only
on daughters’ schooling. They interpret this result as evidence of differences
in maternal and paternal preferences for the schooling of daughters relative
to sons. These findings suggest the presence of a ‘gender role model’ ef-
fect, or that mothers and fathers may allocate their resources differently to
daughters’ and sons’ education and that pooling parents’ incomes might be
inappropriate.39 Unfortunately, the BCS70 does not have separate informa-
39Although the fact that the effect of mother’s social class, which is a proxy for mother’s
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tion on mother’s and father’s incomes.
There is also a positive effect of father’s social class. An individual whose
father is from social class IV, for example, is 16 percentage points less likely
to obtain a HE, while no effect of mother’s social class is found over and
above that of mother’s education.
Children whose fathers were only moderately interested or not interested
at all in their education when they were aged 10 are 5.8 and 16.8 percentage
points less likely to obtain a HE, respectively, while children whose mothers
were only scarcely interested in their education are 15.3 percentage points
less likely to get a HE. Therefore, we also observe a ‘gender role’ effect, sim-
ilar to that noted for mother’s education, for mother’s interest in children’s
education, which affects only daughters’ educational attainment.
As to the effect of income, an increase of 24 pounds sterling in weekly
family income raises the probability of HE by 0.9 percentage points. Hence,
the effect of household income is greater on the educational achievement of
daughters than it is on that of sons, which confirms early findings by Rice
(1987) and Ermisch and Francesconi (2000a).40 The same effect computed
from the models estimated considering only non missing observations or in-
cluding missing value dummies is 1%. Since families are likely to be equally
credit constrained irrespective of the gender of their children, the differential
impact of income for males and females may be due to a stronger consump-
tion motive for the education of daughters, or to the greater uncertainty
of their return to education. However, these tentative explanations would
require further research.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the role of household income on children’s ed-
ucational outcomes. It has addressed the issue of missing information for
parents’ income using a hot-deck multiple imputation procedure, and that
of the ability bias by including an indicator of innate ability (British Ability
Scales) and using IV techniques. The analysis of the highest educational
qualification obtained shows that, though statistically significant and pos-
itive, the impact of current family income does not seem to be important
permanent income, is not significant does not support the latter hypothesis.
40Although the former study does not control for both child ability and parents’ educa-
tion while the latter does not control for child ability.
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in determining children’s educational attainment. By contrast, long-term
family characteristics, such as parents’ social class and education, are of
paramount importance. Thus, my results argue in favour of the relatively
scarce effectiveness of policies based on temporary (non-schooling contin-
gent) monetary transfers to poor families (see for example Cameron and
Heckman 1998, 2001) when the child’s cognitive development can be consid-
ered as already completed (at age 16). My analysis shows, however, that a
child’s early cognitive development, measured by the British Ability Scales,
is an important predictor of his/her future educational outcomes and it may
be partially determined by early parental inputs, aspect which should be
subject to further research.
Other interesting findings of the analysis are that, while father’s edu-
cation affects the educational attainment of both sons and daughters, with
a stronger effect on the former, mother’s education affects only the educa-
tional attainment of the latter. These gender differences may be interpreted
as the effect on children of the ‘gender role model’ that they have inher-
ited from their parents, or as the outcome of gender differences in parental
preferences with regard to children’s education. However, this finding, too,
requires more research.
7 Appendix A: From grouped to continuous fam-
ily income
In the BCS70, family income (i.e. the income of the parents) is observed in
a certain interval on a continuous scale. We want to transform the grouped
variable into a continuous one. The procedure has been investigated by
Stewart (1983). I summarise here only the main features of the problem and
the proposed solution. The latent structure of the model under consideration
is given by:
yi = z′iγ + ui (8)
where yi is the latent family income of individual i, which falls within a
certain interval of the real line (Ak−1, Ak). zi and γ are vectors of regres-
sors affecting family income and of unknown parameters to be estimated,
respectively. ui’s are i.i.d. normally distributed random disturbances with
zero mean and variance σ2 and are assumed to be independent of zi.
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Ad hoc procedures, such as assigning to each individual the midpoint
of her income group, do not in general result in consistent estimates of the
parameters γ, while consistent estimates can be obtained by assigning to
each observation its conditional expectation:
E(yi|Ak−1 < yi < AK , zi) = z′iγ + σ
[
φ(Zk−1)− φ(Zk)
Φ(Zk)− Φ(Zk−1)
]
(9)
where Zk = (Ak − z′iγ)/σ and φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal
density and cumulative distribution functions.
Stewart (1983) suggests several ways to estimate the parameters of in-
terest γ and σ.
In my specific case the parameters are estimated using a maximum like-
lihood estimator.41
After estimating γ and σ consistently, it is possible to obtain predicted
values for yi, i.e. a continuous measure of family income.
This measure is used in a second stage for the estimation of the education
equations (the ordered probit model of the highest education qualification
obtained).
I have included among the regressors zi the variables commonly used in
the estimation of earnings equations, in particular the country of residence,
and for both parents: a quadratic of age (as a proxy for work experience),
the level of education, the ethnic group and also the one-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC 1980) group and the Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC 1980) group, which may be considered a finer disag-
gregation of parental social class. The estimates are reported in table 2.
Since the SIC 1980 group is used to predict parents’ income but is excluded
from the education equation, my method is implicitly equivalent to an IV
estimation procedure, where the SIC 1980 group represents the ‘identifying
instrument’. Analogous exclusion restrictions are applied, for instance, in
Maurin (1999) and Shea (2000). Evidence in favour of the validity of this
exclusion restriction is provided by some of the literature on interindustry
wage differences. First, estimates of the amount of the differences which can
be accounted for by unmeasured workers’ ability generally leave a substan-
tial part of the differences unexplained (see for instance Katz and Summers
41See ‘methods and formulas’ for the TOBIT command in the Stata Reference Manual
(Stata 2001, p. 186-187).
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1989). Moreover, the literature has shown that wage premia are higher in
industries with higher profits, and that industries that pay higher wages do
so in all occupations, findings that are difficult to reconcile with the un-
observed ability hypothesis.42 Therefore, in the present study the problem
of the ability bias is addressed both by including a measure of individual
ability (the BAS score) and by using IV techniques.
8 Appendix B: Multiple Imputation
In this section I summarise the main characteristics of multiple imputation
procedures. The interested reader can find the details in Rubin (1987).
In order to create imputed values for a variable with missing values it is
necessary to accomplish three main tasks:
1. the modeling task. At the modeling stage the researcher chooses a
specific model for the data. Given the variables to be imputed Y and
some covariates X, at this stage the researcher specifies the joint dis-
tribution Pr(X,Y ). Since we are considering the case of ignorable non
response, the posterior distribution of Ymis is the conditional distribu-
tion of Ymis given the observed values X and Yobs. If we assume that
Pr(X,Y ) is modeled in i.i.d. form we obtain:
Pr(X,Y ) =
∫
Pr(X,Y |θ)Pr(θ)dθ =
∫ [ N∏
i=1
fXY (Xi, Yi)
]
Pr(θ)dθ.
(10)
where fXY can be, for instance, a multivariate normal distribution. In
our specific case, the modeling stage consists of specifying the covari-
ates used to match the missing incomes to non-missing incomes.
2. the estimation task. Given that θ and Ymis are a posteriori inde-
pendent with distribution depending on θ only through θY |X (for the
proof see Rubin 1987, p.163), the aim of the estimation task is to ob-
tain the posterior distribution of θY |X so that a random draw of θY |X
can be made. Calculating the posterior distribution of θY |X can be
42Which states that some industries pay higher wages to attract workers with higher
ability. For a brief review see Romer (1996).
26
analytically intractable or computationally demanding. For this rea-
son, approximate posterior distributions corrected using special Monte
Carlo techniques are sometimes used.
3. the imputation task. With an estimation of the posterior distribution
of θY |X in hand it is possible to draw a value of θ, say θ∗, and a value
of Ymis from its conditional posterior distribution given the random
draw for θ, Pr(Ymis|X,Yobs, θ = θ∗). Repeating this process M times
provides M draws from the joint posterior distribution of (Ymis, θ).
In my specific case the modeling, estimation and imputation tasks were
performed using the stata hotdeck command (Mander and Clayton 2001),
which implements a hot-deck multiple imputation procedure. The only de-
gree of freedom that I had was in the specification of the covariates used to
perform the matching between missing and non-missing observations. I re-
ported the results for the model using some family attributes which are more
likely to be correlated with family income and for which item non-response
is relatively low: residence, age, education, ethnicity and social class.43
After accomplishing the imputation task we have M complete data-sets,
which can be analysed using standard statistical procedures. Hence, for each
version of the data set it is possible to obtain an estimate for the parameter
of interest β (see section 4.2), say βˆm. The estimate for β is the average of
the M estimates:
β =
1
M
M∑
m=1
βˆm. (11)
Moreover, indicated with Uˆm the estimated covariance matrix for βˆm,
the average within-imputation covariance matrix is:
U =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Uˆm (12)
while the between-imputation covariance matrix is
B =
1
M − 1
M∑
m=1
(βˆm − β)(βˆm − β)T (13)
43I tried also other imputation models (using for instance also the Standard Industrial
and the Standard Occupational Classifications) and the results were not sensitive to the
particular model used.
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and the estimated total covariance matrix is:
T = (1 + r)U (14)
where r = (1 + 1M )tr(BU
−1) is the average relative increase in variance
due to nonresponse across the components of β.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable
N. obs Mean S.D. N. obs Mean S.D.
Welsh residence 3034 0.06 0.25 3814 0.06 0.23
Scottish residence 3034 0.09 0.29 3814 0.09 0.29
House: owner with mortgage 3034 0.49 0.50 3814 0.49 0.50
House: rented or other 3034 0.18 0.38 3814 0.19 0.39
House: missing information 3034 0.17 0.37 3814 0.15 0.36
BAS score 2289 79.62 15.29 2932 77.89 14.14
BAS score missing 3034 0.25 0.43 3814 0.23 0.42
Father edu. less than 0-level 3034 0.25 0.44 3814 0.27 0.45
Father edu. O-level 3034 0.10 0.30 3814 0.11 0.31
Father edu. A-level 3034 0.05 0.22 3814 0.06 0.23
Father other education 3034 0.07 0.25 3814 0.07 0.26
Father missing education 3034 0.40 0.49 3814 0.37 0.48
Mother edu. less than 0-level 3034 0.29 0.46 3814 0.34 0.47
Mother edu. O-level 3034 0.13 0.34 3814 0.13 0.33
Mother edu. A-level 3034 0.03 0.17 3814 0.03 0.16
Mother other education 3034 0.10 0.30 3814 0.10 0.31
Mother missing education 3034 0.40 0.49 3814 0.37 0.48
Parents' income (£10) 1933 23.48 12.99 2432 22.61 12.78
Missing parents' income 3034 0.36 0.48 3814 0.36 0.48
Father s.c.: II 3034 0.20 0.40 3814 0.20 0.40
Father s.c.: IIINM 3034 0.07 0.25 3814 0.07 0.26
Father s.c.: IIIM 3034 0.24 0.42 3814 0.26 0.44
Father s.c.: IV 3034 0.05 0.22 3814 0.05 0.23
Father s.c.: V 3034 0.01 0.11 3814 0.02 0.13
Father s.c.: Student 3034 0.01 0.10 3814 0.01 0.11
Father: Dead 3034 0.02 0.14 3814 0.02 0.15
Father s.c.: Missing social class 3034 0.35 0.48 3814 0.31 0.46
Mother s.c.: II 3034 0.12 0.32 3814 0.12 0.33
Mother s.c.: IIINM 3034 0.22 0.42 3814 0.22 0.41
Mother s.c.: IIIM 3034 0.03 0.18 3814 0.04 0.20
Mother s.c.: IV 3034 0.10 0.30 3814 0.11 0.32
Mother s.c.: V 3034 0.04 0.19 3814 0.04 0.20
Mother s.c.: Student 3034 0.14 0.35 3814 0.16 0.37
Mother s.c.: Dead 3034 0.00 0.07 3814 0.00 0.07
Mother s.c.: Missing social class 3034 0.33 0.47 3814 0.30 0.46
Age father 3034 28.14 22.62 3814 28.16 22.51
Age mother 3034 29.30 20.52 3814 29.82 20.25
Age father missing 3034 0.38 0.49 3814 0.38 0.49
Age mother missing 3034 0.32 0.47 3814 0.30 0.46
Males Females
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Table 1. (continue)
Variable
N. obs Mean S.D. N. obs Mean S.D.
Disability 3034 0.01 0.08 3814 0.01 0.08
Handicap 3034 0.01 0.09 3814 0.00 0.06
Not known 3034 0.19 0.39 3814 0.17 0.38
West Indian 3034 0.00 0.06 3814 0.01 0.08
Indian 3034 0.01 0.09 3814 0.01 0.10
Pakistani-Bangladeshi 3034 0.01 0.07 3814 0.00 0.05
Mixed and other 3034 0.01 0.08 3814 0.01 0.07
Missing ethnicity 3034 0.18 0.39 3814 0.16 0.37
N. younger siblings 3034 0.56 0.81 3814 0.59 0.84
N. same age siblings 3034 0.02 0.14 3814 0.02 0.13
N. older siblings < 21 3034 0.35 0.56 3814 0.34 0.55
N. older siblings >= 21 3034 0.16 0.50 3814 0.17 0.52
No siblings information 3034 0.18 0.38 3814 0.16 0.36
Rural housing estate 3034 0.01 0.12 3814 0.02 0.13
Poor housing estate 3034 0.43 0.50 3814 0.43 0.50
Other housing estate 3034 0.11 0.31 3814 0.11 0.32
Missing housing info. 3034 0.31 0.46 3814 0.29 0.46
Natural father only 3034 0.06 0.23 3814 0.07 0.25
Natural mother only 3034 0.01 0.10 3814 0.01 0.08
Natural father + relative 3034 0.05 0.22 3814 0.06 0.23
Natural mother + relative 3034 0.01 0.09 3814 0.01 0.07
Other situation 3034 0.02 0.16 3814 0.03 0.16
Missing family structure 3034 0.20 0.40 3814 0.18 0.39
Father moderately interested 3034 0.16 0.37 3814 0.15 0.36
Father scarcely interested 3034 0.02 0.15 3814 0.02 0.14
Father not interested 3034 0.02 0.13 3814 0.01 0.12
Cannot say 3034 0.47 0.50 3814 0.50 0.50
Mother moderately interested 3034 0.23 0.42 3814 0.23 0.42
Mother scarcely interested 3034 0.03 0.17 3814 0.03 0.16
Mother not interested 3034 0.01 0.12 3814 0.01 0.11
Can not say 3034 0.28 0.45 3814 0.28 0.45
Males Females
Notes.  For  parents’ income and the BAS score,  means and standard deviations are for
the observations with non missing values.
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Table 2. Results of the interval regression for parents’ income
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. P-value
Residence
Welsh residence -24.00 6.82 0.00
Scottish residence 4.08 6.04 0.50
Father's SOC
Missing 21.52 34.21 0.53
Professional -29.34 5.46 0.00
Technical -48.77 5.38 0.00
Administrative 12.47 22.13 0.57
Skilled trades 33.68 24.12 0.16
Personal service 34.06 17.48 0.05
Sales 18.17 16.33 0.27
Process 12.00 15.06 0.43
Elementary 37.41 8.98 0.00
Father's SIC
missing -44.57 34.28 0.19
Agriculture 10.81 9.05 0.23
Energy -48.09 14.01 0.00
Extraction -1.91 8.74 0.83
Metal goods -4.44 7.40 0.55
Other manufacturing -5.04 8.37 0.55
Construction -11.97 7.38 0.11
Distribution -18.07 7.92 0.02
Transport 1.80 7.42 0.81
Banking -0.69 7.53 0.93
Mother's SOC
Missing 12.21 29.02 0.67
Professional -18.05 9.61 0.06
Technical 40.78 7.87 0.00
Administrative 22.62 8.83 0.01
Skilled trades 16.52 32.77 0.61
Personal service 19.10 29.26 0.51
Sales 48.47 32.43 0.14
Process -22.77 32.19 0.48
Elementary 58.77 16.42 0.00
Mother's SIC
missing -17.48 28.96 0.55
Agriculture 12.27 22.27 0.58
Energy 12.53 21.79 0.57
Extraction -0.28 22.19 0.99
Metal goods 29.17 11.74 0.01
Other manufacturing 22.42 9.43 0.02
Construction 14.52 18.34 0.43
Distribution -14.82 5.20 0.00
Transport -24.26 15.20 0.11
Banking -4.40 6.22 0.48
36
Table 2. (continue)
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. P-value
Age father 16.08 3.98 0.00
Age father squared -0.18 0.04 0.00
Age mother 20.56 4.50 0.00
Age mother squared -0.22 0.05 0.00
Age father missing 277.11 93.16 0.00
Age mother missing 509.96 100.47 0.00
Father's Education
Less than O-level -94.76 7.48 0.00
O-Level -68.09 8.27 0.00
A-Level -52.51 9.29 0.00
Other -39.36 9.04 0.00
Missing -93.05 8.74 0.00
Mother's Education
Less than O-level -96.20 11.52 0.00
O-Level -58.49 11.99 0.00
A-Level -41.27 15.34 0.01
Other -55.66 11.62 0.00
Missing -75.20 12.44 0.00
Father's Ethnicity 
West Indian -31.76 32.67 0.33
Indian 13.93 48.94 0.78
Other 35.67 25.65 0.16
Missing -25.18 10.32 0.02
Mother's Ethnicity
West Indian 6.67 34.05 0.85
Indian -31.12 52.31 0.55
Pakistani-Bangladeshi -77.30 16.68 0.00
Other -27.76 21.85 0.20
Missing -19.31 16.50 0.24
N. obs
Wald (p-value)
Log-likelihood
4365
2154.56 (0.00)
-9289.01
Notes. The reference household has the following characteristics: English residence,
father white, with a university education and manager (SOC) in the Other Sectors (SIC),
mother white, with a university education and manager in the Other Sectors. Parents’
income is combined gross income of child’s mother and father (excludes child benefits
but includes all other earned and unearned income before deductions of tax, national
insurance, etc.). In particular, weekly income is reported in categorical form: less than
£50; £50-£99; £100-£149; £150-£199; £200-£249; £250-£299; £300-£349; £350-£399;
£400-£449; £450-£499; £500+; Refusal to answer; uncertain. Observations falling into
the last two categories are considered missing.
37
Table 3. Ordered probit estimates of educational attainment: males
Variable
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Welsh residence 0.1869 0.103 0.07 0.0593 0.084 0.48 0.1698 0.101 0.09
Scottish residence 0.3660 0.087 0.00 0.2971 0.069 0.00 0.3521 0.085 0.00
House: owner with mortgage -0.0615 0.071 0.39 -0.0419 0.061 0.49 -0.0428 0.066 0.52
House: rented or other -0.3462 0.083 0.00 -0.3476 0.071 0.00 -0.3438 0.077 0.00
House: missing information - - - -0.8446 0.223 0.00 - - -
BAS score -0.0479 0.012 0.00 -0.0413 0.011 0.00 -0.0514 0.011 0.00
BAS score squared 0.0005 0.000 0.00 0.0004 0.000 0.00 0.0005 0.000 0.00
BAS score missing -0.8692 0.449 0.05 -0.5408 0.407 0.18 -1.0011 0.409 0.01
Father edu. less than 0-level -0.4621 0.122 0.00 -0.3903 0.100 0.00 -0.4880 0.117 0.00
Father edu. O-level -0.2940 0.127 0.02 -0.2289 0.105 0.03 -0.3469 0.123 0.01
Father edu. A-level -0.1197 0.146 0.41 -0.0955 0.123 0.44 -0.1621 0.140 0.25
Father other education -0.1963 0.136 0.15 -0.1349 0.113 0.23 -0.2145 0.131 0.10
Father missing education -0.5013 0.139 0.00 -0.4500 0.115 0.00 -0.4755 0.134 0.00
Mother edu. less than 0-level -0.2985 0.190 0.12 -0.4647 0.157 0.00 -0.3178 0.189 0.09
Mother edu. O-level -0.2733 0.196 0.16 -0.3549 0.161 0.03 -0.2319 0.194 0.23
Mother edu. A-level -0.2027 0.243 0.40 -0.2983 0.201 0.14 -0.2261 0.241 0.35
Mother other education -0.2150 0.186 0.25 -0.3051 0.152 0.05 -0.2036 0.186 0.28
Mother missing education -0.3675 0.200 0.07 -0.4631 0.166 0.01 -0.3678 0.199 0.07
Parents' income (£10) 0.0090 0.000 0.00 0.0060 0.000 0.01 0.0073 0.003 0.01
Missing parents' income - - - 0.1005 0.078 0.20 - - -
Father s.c.: II -0.4877 0.159 0.00 -0.4163 0.127 0.00 -0.4431 0.151 0.00
Father s.c.: IIINM -0.3840 0.181 0.03 -0.4806 0.148 0.00 -0.3865 0.171 0.02
Father s.c.: IIIM -0.5812 0.168 0.00 -0.5965 0.134 0.00 -0.5994 0.158 0.00
Father s.c.: IV -0.5732 0.196 0.00 -0.6337 0.156 0.00 -0.5949 0.184 0.00
Father s.c.: V -0.4682 0.313 0.14 -0.6971 0.248 0.01 -0.5958 0.287 0.04
Father s.c.: Student -0.4447 0.271 0.10 -0.3830 0.231 0.10 -0.4397 0.265 0.10
Father: Dead -0.4453 0.246 0.07 -0.5321 0.221 0.02 -0.5010 0.238 0.04
Father s.c.: Missing social class -0.2740 0.202 0.17 -0.4524 0.159 0.00 -0.3948 0.191 0.04
Mother s.c.: II 0.1994 0.451 0.66 0.1027 0.382 0.79 0.1549 0.465 0.74
Mother s.c.: IIINM 0.1964 0.456 0.67 0.1168 0.386 0.76 0.1240 0.469 0.79
Mother s.c.: IIIM 0.3277 0.469 0.49 0.2617 0.395 0.51 0.2402 0.479 0.62
Mother s.c.: IV 0.0680 0.464 0.88 0.0045 0.390 0.99 0.0440 0.475 0.93
Mother s.c.: V 0.2579 0.473 0.59 0.1584 0.400 0.69 0.2495 0.483 0.61
Mother s.c.: Student 0.2386 0.458 0.60 0.1361 0.386 0.72 0.2043 0.470 0.66
Mother s.c.: Dead 0.9034 0.564 0.11 0.4552 0.473 0.34 0.6222 0.564 0.27
Mother s.c.: Missing social class -0.1409 0.467 0.76 -0.0218 0.393 0.96 -0.1349 0.478 0.78
Age father -0.0051 0.062 0.94 -0.0541 0.055 0.33 0.0155 0.062 0.80
Age father squared 0.0001 0.001 0.92 0.0007 0.001 0.25 -0.0001 0.001 0.88
Age mother 0.0813 0.078 0.29 0.1449 0.066 0.03 0.0810 0.076 0.29
Age mother squared -0.0008 0.001 0.37 -0.0016 0.001 0.03 -0.0008 0.001 0.33
Age father missing -0.0180 1.481 0.99 -1.0392 1.307 0.43 0.6035 1.465 0.68
Age mother missing 1.8623 1.734 0.28 3.1955 1.483 0.03 1.7613 1.696 0.30
Child smokes -0.5332 0.070 0.00 -0.4544 0.057 0.00 -0.4885 0.066 0.00
Impairment -0.0117 0.136 0.93 -0.0791 0.116 0.50 -0.0454 0.126 0.72
Disability -0.6951 0.285 0.02 -0.4909 0.216 0.02 -0.6231 0.234 0.01
Handicap -0.2463 0.282 0.38 -0.4351 0.271 0.11 -0.4364 0.272 0.11
Not known 0.4588 0.185 0.01 0.3170 0.139 0.02 0.3286 0.157 0.04
West Indian 0.1387 0.293 0.64 0.4152 0.279 0.14 0.1334 0.303 0.66
Indian 1.2918 0.413 0.00 1.2279 0.355 0.00 1.2165 0.377 0.00
Pakistani-Bangladeshi 0.8511 0.465 0.07 0.5384 0.377 0.15 0.6500 0.443 0.14
Mixed and other 0.1832 0.454 0.69 0.1808 0.330 0.58 0.1742 0.449 0.70
Missing ethnicity 0.1243 0.244 0.61 -0.0148 0.195 0.94 -0.0939 0.259 0.72
N. younger siblings 0.0823 0.032 0.01 0.0803 0.028 0.00 0.0682 0.031 0.03
N. same age siblings -0.2269 0.165 0.17 -0.1798 0.141 0.20 -0.2209 0.152 0.15
N. older siblings < 21 -0.0758 0.044 0.09 -0.0817 0.039 0.03 -0.0864 0.041 0.04
N. older siblings >= 21 -0.0487 0.049 0.32 -0.0110 0.043 0.80 -0.0151 0.046 0.75
No siblings information 0.5468 0.641 0.39 0.4178 0.260 0.11 0.5839 0.589 0.32
Non-missing sample Missing value dummy Multiple hotdeck
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Table 3. (continue)
Variable
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Rural housing estate -0.3162 0.207 0.13 -0.2874 0.200 0.15 -0.4202 0.205 0.04
Poor housing estate -0.0597 0.072 0.41 -0.0421 0.062 0.50 -0.0559 0.066 0.40
Other housing estate -0.1239 0.093 0.18 -0.0938 0.080 0.24 -0.1251 0.086 0.15
Missing housing info. 0.0624 0.090 0.49 0.0915 0.079 0.25 0.0745 0.085 0.38
Natural father only 0.0081 0.130 0.95 0.0099 0.118 0.93 -0.0198 0.125 0.87
Natural mother only 0.1367 0.291 0.64 0.1764 0.244 0.47 0.1549 0.257 0.55
Natural father + relative -0.0542 0.097 0.58 -0.1145 0.085 0.18 -0.0937 0.090 0.30
Natural mother + relative 0.2661 0.280 0.34 0.0494 0.242 0.84 0.0987 0.266 0.71
Other situation 0.0237 0.149 0.87 -0.1939 0.136 0.15 -0.1206 0.147 0.41
Missing family structure 0.1325 0.143 0.35 0.0388 0.115 0.74 0.1285 0.126 0.31
Father moderately interested -0.1589 0.094 0.09 -0.1528 0.073 0.04 -0.1824 0.086 0.03
Father scarcely interested -0.1892 0.197 0.34 -0.1383 0.154 0.37 -0.1891 0.189 0.32
Father not interested -0.1496 0.215 0.49 -0.0943 0.165 0.57 -0.1213 0.203 0.55
Cannot say -0.2371 0.080 0.00 -0.1539 0.062 0.01 -0.2390 0.074 0.00
Mother moderately interested -0.0704 0.080 0.38 -0.1340 0.062 0.03 -0.0406 0.073 0.58
Mother scarcely interested -0.1582 0.171 0.36 -0.2899 0.132 0.03 -0.2078 0.161 0.20
Mother not interested -0.2218 0.241 0.36 -0.0952 0.205 0.64 -0.1824 0.237 0.44
Cannot say 0.0346 0.089 0.70 -0.0751 0.069 0.28 0.0046 0.083 0.96
N-obs
Log-likelihood
 Pseudo R
2      
N inputations
3034
10
Non-missing sample Missing value dummy Multiple hotdeck
1933
-2349.32
0.14
3034
-3752.93
0.12
Notes. Coefficients on grey background are significant at the 5% level. The reference
individual  has the following characteristics: white ethnicity, no disability, non smoking,
living in England in accomodation owned outright by his parents in an affluent area and
with both natural parents, both parents with university educations, from social class I and
interested in their children’s education. All the characteristics except the BAS score (age
10) and parents’ interest in children’s education (age 10) are observed at age 16.
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Table 4. Ordered probit estimates of educational attainment: females
Variable
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Welsh residence 0.0494 0.110 0.65 0.1073 0.087 0.22 0.0365 0.107 0.73
Scottish residence 0.3479 0.077 0.00 0.2640 0.062 0.00 0.3661 0.075 0.00
House: owner with mortgage -0.0837 0.062 0.18 -0.0601 0.051 0.24 -0.0794 0.057 0.16
House: rented or other -0.2654 0.075 0.00 -0.2678 0.063 0.00 -0.2847 0.069 0.00
House: missing information - - - 0.0525 0.260 0.84 -0.0245 0.286 0.93
BAS score -0.0136 0.010 0.18 -0.0193 0.008 0.02 -0.0153 0.009 0.10
BAS score squared 0.0003 0.000 0.00 0.0003 0.000 0.00 0.0003 0.000 0.00
BAS score missing 0.5906 0.381 0.12 0.3681 0.295 0.21 0.5185 0.349 0.14
Father edu. less than 0-level -0.2915 0.106 0.01 -0.2704 0.086 0.00 -0.2707 0.100 0.01
Father edu. O-level -0.2590 0.113 0.02 -0.2601 0.092 0.01 -0.2278 0.106 0.03
Father edu. A-level -0.0808 0.122 0.51 -0.1551 0.101 0.12 -0.0651 0.117 0.58
Father other education -0.2462 0.117 0.04 -0.2466 0.095 0.01 -0.2331 0.112 0.04
Father missing education -0.3944 0.120 0.00 -0.3707 0.096 0.00 -0.3260 0.113 0.00
Mother edu. less than 0-level -0.7778 0.147 0.00 -0.8057 0.127 0.00 -0.8109 0.143 0.00
Mother edu. O-level -0.6949 0.152 0.00 -0.7438 0.131 0.00 -0.7427 0.147 0.00
Mother edu. A-level -0.4743 0.202 0.02 -0.4883 0.169 0.00 -0.4865 0.201 0.02
Mother other education -0.4821 0.151 0.00 -0.4541 0.130 0.00 -0.4867 0.147 0.00
Mother missing education -0.8407 0.161 0.00 -0.8466 0.138 0.00 -0.8622 0.156 0.00
Parents' income (£10) 0.0145 0.000 0.00 0.0141 0.000 0.00 0.0115 0.002 0.00
Missing parents' income - - - 0.3208 0.067 0.00 - - -
Father s.c.: II -0.3490 0.133 0.01 -0.4358 0.103 0.00 -0.3288 0.121 0.01
Father s.c.: IIINM -0.4120 0.154 0.01 -0.4721 0.120 0.00 -0.3609 0.141 0.01
Father s.c.: IIIM -0.4097 0.143 0.00 -0.5332 0.110 0.00 -0.4070 0.130 0.00
Father s.c.: IV -0.4584 0.168 0.01 -0.5527 0.129 0.00 -0.4482 0.151 0.00
Father s.c.: V -0.5984 0.207 0.00 -0.7188 0.177 0.00 -0.6080 0.191 0.00
Father s.c.: Student -0.6645 0.298 0.03 -0.7854 0.227 0.00 -0.7347 0.245 0.00
Father: Dead -0.1130 0.202 0.58 -0.1457 0.163 0.37 -0.1178 0.186 0.53
Father s.c.: Missing social class -0.4465 0.166 0.01 -0.4967 0.128 0.00 -0.4517 0.150 0.00
Mother s.c.: II 0.4010 0.545 0.46 0.4058 0.386 0.29 0.3917 0.545 0.47
Mother s.c.: IIINM 0.3516 0.547 0.52 0.3818 0.389 0.33 0.3164 0.547 0.56
Mother s.c.: IIIM 0.1267 0.553 0.82 0.2378 0.394 0.55 0.0838 0.552 0.88
Mother s.c.: IV 0.2770 0.548 0.61 0.3468 0.390 0.37 0.2714 0.548 0.62
Mother s.c.: V 0.2557 0.556 0.65 0.2536 0.397 0.52 0.2276 0.554 0.68
Mother s.c.: Student 0.2778 0.547 0.61 0.3335 0.388 0.39 0.2567 0.547 0.64
Mother s.c.: Dead -0.1231 0.724 0.87 -0.0022 0.477 1.00 0.0596 0.651 0.93
Mother s.c.: Missing social class 0.3104 0.549 0.57 0.2970 0.392 0.45 0.2765 0.549 0.61
Age father -0.0371 0.061 0.54 -0.0013 0.049 0.98 -0.0216 0.059 0.72
Age father squared 0.0005 0.001 0.45 0.0001 0.001 0.83 0.0003 0.001 0.62
Age mother 0.0551 0.067 0.41 0.0162 0.055 0.77 0.0887 0.064 0.16
Age mother squared -0.0005 0.001 0.48 -0.0001 0.001 0.87 -0.0009 0.001 0.22
Age father missing -0.5137 1.445 0.72 0.3256 1.166 0.78 -0.1834 1.397 0.90
Age mother missing 1.1840 1.487 0.43 0.2858 1.229 0.82 1.9500 1.422 0.17
Child smokes -0.5397 0.059 0.00 -0.4865 0.048 0.00 -0.4943 0.052 0.00
Impairment -0.1356 0.177 0.44 -0.1414 0.157 0.37 -0.0988 0.170 0.56
Disability -0.3861 0.289 0.18 -0.2348 0.261 0.37 -0.2607 0.272 0.34
Handicap -0.6180 0.355 0.08 -0.6326 0.357 0.08 -0.6182 0.352 0.08
Not known -0.4238 0.152 0.01 -0.3810 0.131 0.00 -0.3853 0.137 0.01
West Indian 0.3792 0.246 0.12 0.4542 0.210 0.03 0.4486 0.251 0.07
Indian 0.4552 0.256 0.08 0.5058 0.204 0.01 0.5914 0.249 0.02
Pakistani-Bangladeshi 0.1544 0.516 0.77 0.0939 0.462 0.84 0.1067 0.470 0.82
Mixed and other -0.0644 0.295 0.83 -0.0469 0.284 0.87 -0.0334 0.294 0.91
Missing ethnicity 0.0364 0.247 0.88 -0.0257 0.207 0.90 -0.0625 0.224 0.78
N. younger siblings 0.0400 0.031 0.19 0.0322 0.026 0.21 0.0413 0.028 0.14
N. same age siblings 0.1817 0.184 0.32 0.1924 0.140 0.17 0.2293 0.163 0.16
N. older siblings < 21 -0.0559 0.041 0.18 -0.0486 0.035 0.17 -0.0635 0.039 0.10
N. older siblings >= 21 -0.0356 0.043 0.41 -0.0743 0.038 0.05 -0.0416 0.040 0.30
No siblings information -0.1163 0.177 0.51 0.3127 0.287 0.28 0.5738 0.312 0.07
Non-missing sample Missing value dummy Multiple hotdeck
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Table 4. (continue)
Variable
Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Rural housing estate -0.0274 0.163 0.87 -0.0263 0.144 0.86 -0.0132 0.157 0.93
Poor housing estate -0.0177 0.064 0.78 -0.0545 0.055 0.32 -0.0369 0.059 0.53
Other housing estate -0.0451 0.084 0.59 -0.0996 0.070 0.16 -0.0632 0.076 0.41
Missing housing info. -0.0967 0.084 0.25 -0.0966 0.069 0.16 -0.1148 0.076 0.13
Natural father only 0.0896 0.115 0.43 0.0235 0.101 0.82 0.0170 0.109 0.88
Natural mother only 0.3434 0.376 0.36 0.3728 0.284 0.19 0.3056 0.327 0.35
Natural father + relative -0.1880 0.093 0.04 -0.2413 0.080 0.00 -0.1990 0.086 0.02
Natural mother + relative 0.2879 0.198 0.15 0.2624 0.178 0.14 0.2984 0.188 0.11
Other situation -0.2174 0.148 0.14 -0.1076 0.125 0.39 -0.1351 0.138 0.33
Missing family structure 0.1754 0.140 0.21 0.0961 0.115 0.40 0.1487 0.129 0.25
Father moderately interested -0.1645 0.085 0.05 -0.1859 0.066 0.01 -0.1735 0.075 0.02
Father scarcely interested 0.3795 0.192 0.05 0.0654 0.167 0.70 0.2686 0.172 0.12
Father not interested -0.7066 0.295 0.02 -0.5391 0.226 0.02 -0.5823 0.262 0.03
Cannot say -0.1845 0.069 0.01 -0.2101 0.055 0.00 -0.1724 0.061 0.01
Mother moderately interested -0.1066 0.071 0.13 -0.0860 0.056 0.13 -0.1171 0.063 0.06
Mother scarcely interested -0.5689 0.174 0.00 -0.3650 0.138 0.01 -0.5309 0.145 0.00
Mother not interested -0.2527 0.340 0.46 -0.1048 0.261 0.69 -0.2112 0.286 0.46
Cannot say -0.1541 0.075 0.04 -0.0747 0.061 0.22 -0.1292 0.067 0.05
N-obs
Log-likelihood
 Pseudo R
2      
N inputations
3814
10
Non-missing sample Missing value dummy Multiple hotdeck
2432
-2933.95
0.15
3814
-4701.36
0.13
Notes. Coefficients on grey background are significant at the 5% level. The reference
individual  has the following characteristics: white ethnicity, no disability, non smoking,
living in England in accomodation owned outright by her parents in an affluent area and
with both natural parents, both parents with university educations, from social class I and
interested in their children’s education. All the characteristics except the BAS score (age
10) and parents’ interest in children’s education (age 10) are observed at age 16.
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Table 5. Marginal effects from the mutliple hot-deck model: males
Variable < O-level O-level Vocational A-level UG Degree or higher
Welsh residence -0.003 -0.030 -0.035 0.004 0.064
Scottish residence -0.005 -0.057 -0.077 0.003 0.135
House: owner with mortgage 0.001 0.007 0.009 -0.001 -0.016
House: rented or other 0.008 0.070 0.058 -0.014 -0.122
BAS score -0.004 -0.060 -0.092 0.000 0.156
Father edu. less than 0-level 0.007 0.079 0.105 -0.005 -0.187
Father edu. O-level 0.004 0.052 0.080 0.000 -0.135
Father edu. A-level 0.001 0.021 0.039 0.002 -0.064
Father other education 0.002 0.029 0.051 0.002 -0.085
Father missing education 0.006 0.077 0.103 -0.004 -0.182
Parents' income (£10) 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.007
Father s.c.: II 0.005 0.064 0.103 0.002 -0.173
Father s.c.: IIINM 0.004 0.054 0.091 0.003 -0.152
Father s.c.: IIIM 0.008 0.095 0.130 -0.004 -0.229
Father s.c.: IV 0.008 0.094 0.130 -0.004 -0.228
Father s.c.: V 0.008 0.094 0.130 -0.004 -0.228
Father s.c.: Student 0.005 0.063 0.102 0.002 -0.172
Father: Dead 0.006 0.075 0.114 0.000 -0.194
Father s.c.: Missing social class 0.004 0.055 0.093 0.003 -0.155
Child smokes 0.014 0.106 0.071 -0.024 -0.166
Impairment 0.001 0.009 0.008 -0.002 -0.016
Disability 0.027 0.153 0.048 -0.042 -0.186
Handicap 0.015 0.102 0.049 -0.026 -0.140
Not known -0.005 -0.054 -0.071 0.004 0.126
West Indian -0.002 -0.023 -0.028 0.003 0.051
Indian -0.006 -0.109 -0.275 -0.057 0.447
Pakistani-Bangladeshi -0.006 -0.083 -0.155 -0.012 0.254
Mixed and other -0.003 -0.030 -0.037 0.003 0.066
Missing ethnicity 0.002 0.018 0.017 -0.003 -0.034
N. younger siblings -0.001 -0.012 -0.014 0.002 0.026
N. same age siblings 0.005 0.046 0.036 -0.010 -0.078
N. older siblings < 21 0.002 0.017 0.016 -0.003 -0.031
N. older siblings >= 21 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.006
No siblings information -0.005 -0.078 -0.138 -0.008 0.229
Rural housing estate 0.012 0.093 0.058 -0.022 -0.141
Poor housing estate 0.001 0.010 0.011 -0.002 -0.021
Other housing estate 0.003 0.024 0.023 -0.004 -0.046
Missing housing info. -0.001 -0.013 -0.015 0.002 0.028
Father moderately interested 0.003 0.032 0.038 -0.004 -0.069
Father scarcely interested 0.003 0.033 0.039 -0.004 -0.071
Father not interested 0.002 0.021 0.026 -0.002 -0.046
Cannot say 0.004 0.043 0.048 -0.006 -0.089
Highest education
Notes. Marginal effects are computed for the ‘average individual’, i.e. for the individual
with sample average values for all variables. They may not sum to 0 because of rounding.
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Table 6. Marginal effects from the multiple hot-deck model: females
Variable < O-level O-level Vocational A-level UG Degree or higher
Welsh residence -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 0.002 0.012
Scottish residence -0.005 -0.069 -0.071 0.015 0.130
House: owner with mortgage 0.001 0.016 0.014 -0.004 -0.027
House: rented or other 0.006 0.064 0.039 -0.019 -0.091
House: missing information 0.000 0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.008
BAS score -0.005 -0.080 -0.099 0.013 0.172
Father edu. less than 0-level 0.004 0.053 0.050 -0.013 -0.094
Father edu. O-level 0.003 0.044 0.043 -0.010 -0.080
Father edu. A-level 0.001 0.011 0.014 -0.002 -0.024
Father other education 0.003 0.045 0.044 -0.010 -0.082
Father missing education 0.005 0.066 0.057 -0.017 -0.112
Mother edu. less than 0-level 0.008 0.123 0.181 -0.008 -0.303
Mother edu. O-level 0.006 0.108 0.171 -0.004 -0.281
Mother edu. A-level 0.003 0.059 0.122 0.008 -0.191
Mother other education 0.003 0.059 0.122 0.008 -0.191
Mother missing education 0.009 0.135 0.187 -0.012 -0.319
Parents' income (£10) -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 0.002 0.009
Father s.c.: II 0.004 0.057 0.070 -0.010 -0.121
Father s.c.: IIINM 0.004 0.064 0.075 -0.012 -0.131
Father s.c.: IIIM 0.005 0.074 0.082 -0.015 -0.147
Father s.c.: IV 0.006 0.083 0.088 -0.017 -0.160
Father s.c.: V 0.011 0.122 0.105 -0.030 -0.207
Father s.c.: Student 0.015 0.156 0.111 -0.042 -0.241
Father: Dead 0.001 0.018 0.028 -0.002 -0.045
Father s.c.: Missing social class 0.006 0.084 0.088 -0.018 -0.161
Child smokes 0.015 0.122 0.047 -0.039 -0.144
Impairment 0.002 0.021 0.016 -0.006 -0.033
Disability 0.006 0.059 0.035 -0.018 -0.083
Handicap 0.022 0.158 0.043 -0.052 -0.171
Not known 0.010 0.092 0.044 -0.029 -0.117
West Indian -0.005 -0.077 -0.095 0.013 0.165
Indian -0.006 -0.094 -0.131 0.010 0.221
Pakistani-Bangladeshi -0.009 -0.031 0.012 0.011 0.018
Mixed and other 0.003 0.010 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005
Missing ethnicity 0.006 0.018 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009
Natural father only 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.006
Natural mother only -0.004 -0.058 -0.058 0.013 0.108
Natural father + relative 0.005 0.048 0.023 -0.015 -0.060
Natural mother + relative -0.004 -0.057 -0.057 0.013 0.105
Other situation 0.003 0.032 0.017 -0.010 -0.042
Missing family structure -0.003 -0.031 -0.025 0.008 0.051
Father moderately interested 0.003 0.037 0.028 -0.010 -0.058
Father scarcely interested -0.003 -0.045 -0.059 0.007 0.100
Father not interested 0.018 0.144 0.052 -0.046 -0.168
Cannot say 0.003 0.037 0.028 -0.010 -0.058
Mother moderately interested 0.002 0.025 0.019 -0.007 -0.039
Mother scarcely interested 0.017 0.132 0.047 -0.043 -0.153
Mother not interested 0.004 0.047 0.031 -0.014 -0.068
Cannot say 0.002 0.028 0.021 -0.008 -0.043
Highest education
Notes. Marginal effects are computed for the ‘average individual’, i.e. for the individual
with sample average values for all variables. They may not sum to 0 because of rounding.
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Figure 1. Distribution of weekly parents’ income (£10) for the ‘non-missing
income sample’ and for the imputed observations (average of the 10
imputations).
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